

"After the general idea of virtue, I know no higher principle than that of right; or rather these two ideas are united in one. The idea of right is simply that of virtue introduced into the political world. It was the idea of right which enabled men to define anarchy and tyranny; and which taught them how to be independent without arrogance, and to obey without servility. The man who submits to violence is debased by his compliance; but when he submits to that right of authority which he acknowledges in a fellow-creature, he rises in some measure above the person who gives the command. There are no great men without virtue; and there are no great nations,--it may almost be added, there would be no society,--without respect for right; for what is a union of rational and intelligent beings who are held together only by the bond of force?"

--Alexis de Tocqueville

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This issue is dedicated to Kara Louise Crispin, 7 lb., 1 oz., who entered the world 1:30 A.M., February 17, 1965. -wokl-

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You are right, I shouldn't have said that in self-defense we should depose "all" Communist regimes. As you say, Yugoslavia is not "striving for world conquest". Very well, let's say that we should depose all Communist regimes that are still imbued with chiliastic purpose, and exclude those like Yugoslavia which abandon all attempts at forcibly spreading their system. Okay?

My analogy of a woman killing a man who tries to rape her becomes rather strained, you say, when I advocate deposing all Red regimes on the ground that the best defense is a good offense. "Tell me," you ask, "do you believe that a woman is justified in going out and killing all of the men who might conceivably rape her or who have at one time or another talk-

ed about doing so?" To continue the analogy, if the men in question have not only talked of raping her, but have adopted a religion which requires them to commit rape whenever practical, have formed a club dedicated to rape, and have proved their intentions and ability by raping a number of her neighbors; then yes, certainly, she is entitled to go out and kill them.

I am, you assert, "an American nationalist, to whom the interests of a geographical and political unit known as the United States are the standard against which any conceivable action is to be judged. Your philosophy has nothing to do with 'liberty', 'self-determination', 'cooperation', 'democracy' or 'freedom'; it is, simply and brutally, 'America First!' America the beautiful, in your view, has the absolute right to crush any weaker nation which interferes with its interests."

This is very humbling; apparently I don't write as clearly as I had thought, if you could extract that from my statements. First, I carefully specified that I was speaking of the duties of the U.S. Government, not of private individuals. The duty of the U.S. Government is to look after the rights and interests of American nationals, just as the duty of the Soviet Government is to look after the rights and interests of Soviet nationals, and so on. On that basis, our government, like all other governments, does have "the absolute right to crush any weaker nation which interferes with its interests." It also has the right, though obviously not

the ability, to crush stronger nations that interfere with its interests. (This is a concise summation of the state of anarchy which has in fact prevailed within the community of nations since the dawn of history, but is this system a desirable one and, more important, is it compatible with the continued existence of civilization? I think a good case can be made that the answer to both questions is negative, and I furthermore believe that there is an historical trend discernible which will eventually rectify this situation. The original mode of human society was anarchy: men were grouped into independent family units (the smallest conceivable viable unit of organization), each operating entirely on its own and each suspicious of every other. The requirements for existence in a hostile environment eventually dictated the creation of more efficient units, the first true communities, and law (primitive, at first, to be sure) was substituted for anarchy. The definitive characteristic of a community is that it requires of each participant obedience to a code of conduct formulated and enforced by the community; the larger and more advanced the community, the more sophisticated its code of conduct. The trend which began when a few family units organized the first regulated community is still progressing--slowly, to be sure--and the tendency is toward ever-larger units. The nationalist, who believes the great nation-states of the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries to be the glorious culmination of this trend, is both mistaken and dangerous. We are currently living in an era in which nationalism (except in Africa and Asia, where its advent was delayed) is on the wane; the character of this epoch may be discerned by noting that speculation about a United States of Europe, a United States of North America (combining the U.S. and Canada) and a United States of Latin America is not confined to utopians but is increasingly widespread among practical political leaders. The inevitable culmination of this trend will be a world government with the power to enforce order and deal with dissident nations. Our principal task is to survive until this becomes a reality--which shouldn't take as long as you might think, for social evolution like biological evolution is an accelerating process. You may continue to support National Sovereignty and the sort of world in which every nation has the absolute right to kick any other nation in the teeth, of course, just as you may defend the inalienable right of South Carolina to secede from the United States, but your philosophy is rapidly becoming an anachronistic curiosity.)

What sticks in your craw, I suppose, is that you take "interests" to mean "anything at all which any American pleases to do or want." That is not my interpretation. I use "interests" as shorthand to mean the defense of the lives, liberty and property of American nationals. So long as other governments restrict themselves to defending the lives, liberty and property of their nationals, there will be very few genuine points of conflict between the nations. The conflicts arise when governments go beyond defending the rightful interests of their citizens, and begin defending the right of their citizens to trample the rights of others. You mention "self-determination" and "cooperation"; the defense by each government of its nationals' rightful interests is the necessary condition for both self-determination and international cooperation.

I express, you say, "a complete pragmatic attitude, (which) should not be misrepresented as a moral position." This raises a good point: is there a connection between morality and pragmatism? What is morality, anyway?

To clear the air, I dismiss at once the position that morality is a set of rules handed down by the Almighty, to be obeyed without question.

I say that morality, rightly understood, is the set of rules

which we have found by experience and reason to be the best for the survival and well-being of the human race. That is, morality is long-term expediency.

Since morality is based on experience, the rules should be gradually changeable as experience accumulates. The difference between morality and pure pragmatism is that pragmatism proposes that each action be considered as to its consequences ("on its merits"), without recourse to any over-all rules of action; while morality recognizes that since we cannot predict the full consequences of any action, it is better to stick to rules which long experience has shown to usually (but not necessarily always) produce the desired effects. Where there are no established rules of experience, morality and pragmatism fuse.

Applying this to the actions of governments, we find, for example, that appeasement is immoral, precisely because in the long run it usually does not work. It generally produces far more suffering than it prevents. I claim that my "hard" proposals for reducing Communist power are moral, because history convinces me that these are the methods which are most likely to carry out the ultimate ends of morality: the survival and well-being of the human race. (It is certainly true that morality is a set of rules intended to promote the survival and well-being of the human race, but morality is nevertheless something more than merely long-term expediency. The distinction is obscured somewhat by the fact that a moral position may usually be supported by arguments of expediency and, given the nature of Homo sapiens, it is these arguments which are most often decisive in determining which course of action shall be followed. Morality assumes the existence and validity (intuitively perceived, in the final analysis) of certain basic premises, and regulates conduct in such a way as to respect these premises even when it is clearly expedient to act contrary to them. Your philosophy is expediency, not morality, because the only limitation it recognizes is the obvious and entirely pragmatic one of refraining from actions which appear likely to hinder the achievement of the ultimate goal. It is intellectually superior to the orthodox Communist position, which takes insufficient account of long-term consequences, but it is in no sense morally superior. Examine the difference between morality and expediency in the context of a specific situation, e.g., respecting the rights of neutral nations in time of war. Your policy with respect to this could probably be summed up as "We should, as a general rule, respect the neutrality of non-combatants, except in those cases where adhering to this policy would involve the sacrifice of important interests." This

(::::) This is Juan Baldez. Juan grows the coffee beans that
(= =) go into Columbian coffee. Every day Juan must go up in-
(w) to the hills where the coffee beans grow, where he picks
((-)) only the finest, ripest beans.

Each bean is picked by hand, and only the finest are used. (::::)
Then these ripe beans are brought down the mountainside to (= =)
the village, where they are aged by a special process. (w)
Juan is very proud of his skill in picking the beans. ((-))

(::::) On weekends, after a hard week on the plantation, Juan
(= =) and his family go into the big city and take part in the
(w) stoning of the American consulate. Juan is very proud of
((-)) his skill in throwing the stones.

is an eminently pragmatic approach, one which views principle as something to be respected only so long as one is not thereby unduly inconvenienced. The proper moral position is to respect neutrality in every case, even where the interests of one's country could best be served by a contrary course, not because this course offers the best prospects for long-term gain, but because it is right. (It is difficult, of course, to conclusively prove that this is the "right" course, and so such a proposition is usually argued in terms of expediency.) In the closing months of 1940, British ships were being sunk regularly off the west coast of Ireland by German U-boats. Much of this loss could have been avoided had England been free to use the ports of Eire, but the De Valera government refused to permit this. At this time, you may remember, every ship and every cargo was critically important to Great Britain, and Prime Minister Churchill was urged to seize the ports. His reply was unequivocal: "No! That is the very thing we are fighting against! I will not do it!" Morality can be inconvenient at times, especially when your opponent is completely amoral: the criminal uses any methods he can get away with, while the police officer is bound by certain rules. But there is no other way to go about it; to utilize the worst means in pursuit of the noblest ends is simple hypocrisy. I am reminded of a line from the "Profiles in Courage" drama dealing with Mary S. McDowell, a Quaker school-teacher who was discharged from her post because she refused to support the war effort in 1917. In defense of her freedom to dissent, she warns against adopting the methods of tyranny to fight tyranny: "Even if you win the war, you will have lost it, because you never knew what it was you were fighting for." The moral symmetry between your philosophy and that of the Communists consists in the assumption that, since your ends are absolutely and unquestionably the most desirable, then any means which appear likely to be successful are justified.))

Speaking of the overthrow of the Diem government in South Vietnam, you deny my implication that "just" is to be equated with "having desirable consequences." That is true, with qualifications. As stated above, we should follow rules which usually have desirable consequences, while admitting the possibility that occasionally the consequences will be bad. But I deny that the deterioration in Saigon is such a case of a bad result following unexpectedly from the exercise of a generally good rule. There was never any good reason to expect anything but chaos to follow the overthrow of the Diem government. ((The overthrow of a tyrannical and unpopular regime is just regardless of the consequences which follow. If the government which succeeds it is no better, then it, too, should be pulled down.))

This brings us to your assertion that it is self-defeating for us to support "unpopular foreign regimes", because when they are overthrown, we suffer "to the extent that the United States is identified with the erstwhile tyrants". You say "After World War II, the United States could have led a world revolution for freedom, democracy and social justice, but instead we hesitated and the Communists moved in to fill the vacuum. Since then, we have always been on the defensive, supporting the status quo and the despotic rulers against the legitimate aspirations of the people in the under-developed world... (We have adopted) a foreign policy which almost invariably places us on the wrong side of every struggle for liberty and dignity."

Well, I can wholeheartedly agree that we missed some wonderful opportunities after World War II, though I doubt if you would approve of what I think we should have done in the cause of freedom.

I believe that your basic error is in the implicit assumption that the people in the "under-developed world" are actually struggling for liberty. (I assume that by "liberty" you mean personal freedom, not just freedom from foreign domination.) South Vietnam is a case in point.

I have yet to learn of any faction there which is seriously interested in establishing a democratic or libertarian society. Each group wants power for itself. The underdogs do not want an end to the dog-fight; they just want to become top dog. That is why the murder of Diem could not have been reasonably expected to solve anything. The makings for a stable democracy did not then and still do not exist in South Vietnam. The only choice is which set of authoritarians will rule. We got rid of the dictator who had shown that he could rule effectively, and quite unsurprisingly he was replaced with would-be dictators who can't rule effectively. We are still keeping the pot boiling by insisting on a "representative" government which "includes all the elements of society", etc., which in the present nature of Vietnamese society means that the government must include those whose aim is to overthrow it. One could hardly imagine a better prescription for prolonged chaos.

This kind of mess is endemic in the "underdeveloped world", where the ideals of Western, and especially Anglo-Saxon, culture have never taken root. (Which, of course, is an important reason why it is "underdeveloped".) We are very foolish to imagine that the culture which we have taken a thousand years to develop could be adopted overnight by others outside our traditions.

We should get over the notion that "the people" of the underdeveloped world are yearning for liberty, but are suppressed by their brutal masters. Most of them don't give a diddly damn about liberty--they don't even know what it is. What they want is wealth, security, and their own crack at being masters.

To be sure, the evolution of a libertarian society is their best chance for wealth and security; the problem is to convince them of that. They see our wealth and wish to emulate it, but they don't realize, and we make little effort to teach them, that we became wealthy by having political and economic freedom. We blither about democracy and freedom at the same time that we tamely acquiesce in the expropriation of American property. That is hardly the way to teach the virtues of economic freedom, which is based on the right to private property. (The socialist from an underdeveloped country would reply that "economic freedom" generally refers to the freedom of a small minority to grow fat off the labor of the masses, and as such is a "freedom" which can be readily dispensed with in this day and age.)

Since World War II, only a few nations which were authoritarian have become reasonably libertarian. The most successful are Japan and West Germany, and it is no coincidence that they were the losers of the war. It takes a catastrophe of that magnitude to make such a fundamental change in the character of a society. With that in mind, what do you think we should have done after World War II to promote "democracy and social justice"? (Are you certain that two examples are enough on which to base a general rule concerning the conditions under which a society may undergo a fundamental change in its character? As for what the United States should have done to promote democracy and social justice, I suggest that you read "Leadership for a World in Revolution", by Sidney Lens, in the January, 1965, Progressive. Briefly, we should, as I said, have aligned ourselves with the people rather than the governments, openly supported anti-colonialist movements, and supported foreign governments on the basis of their popularity rather than their degree of anti-Communism.)

Overthrowing all the despots in sight would have accomplished nothing; they would only have been replaced by other despots. To produce democratic governments, we would have had to occupy the whole world and administer it until democracy had caught on, as we did in the Philippines. This would have been ridiculously impractical on a global scale, especially with the Communists working against us.

I think we should have opposed Communist imperialism even more vigorously than we did, e.g., broken the Berlin blockade with armor, bombed across the Yalu, and helped the Hungarian revolt. We should not have aided any collectivist government--one does not spread freedom by subsidizing socialism--and we should have vigorously promoted free trade. In particular, we should not have ever tolerated expropriation of American property. Certainly, no foreign country should be compelled to accept American investment, but once the investment has been freely accepted, its expropriation should be severely punished. By forcing the governments of the "underdeveloped world" to observe proper behavior with us, we would, hopefully, provide a standard against which their peoples might judge them and eventually reform them. To do more than this, we would have to establish the kind of American Empire which would destroy our claim to moral leadership.

"Science has been defined as a body of knowledge. But that means about as much as saying that you can find all the works of Shakespeare in the dictionary, because all the words are there. One of the things which blocked scientific progress for nearly two thousand years was the idea that the Greeks had had the last word for it, that the knowledge existed. And such knowledge, untested by experiment, could be adapted or interpreted to suit the beliefs of the times, or to conform to doctrine. A 'body of knowledge' unchallenged and un replenished goes sick and may become itself superstition--like astrology, which started off as that exercise of observation and reason which we call astronomy, the charting of the stars in their courses. No, science is not just knowledge; it is knowledge working for its living, correcting itself, and adding to itself." --Ritchie Calder, in "Science in Our Lives".

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Re the "Better Red than Dead" editorial in #72, I've always considered this kind of question sort of silly myself, but there are characters who take it dead seriously. The whole thing is terribly academic, because if the lid ever blows off and they push the button with us pushing buttons at the same time, there will be no choices to be made by the ones who are so excited about the whole deal.

However, considering that this question could be understood as implying another World War II-type conflict, instead of the thermonuclear destruction that would be the means of combat in a major confrontation, I still think it is remarkably inane to run around saying that mass suicide is better than submission. To use an example Bertrand Russell is rather fond of citing, the French during World War II lived under the Nazi regime for a considerable time, but their underground resistance fighters kept the spirit of freedom alive in France. If the French people had had John Birch types around saying something to the effect of "Better Dead than Nazi" and had listened to them, there would have been no France left to resurrect itself after the fall of the Third Reich.

If I had the choice personally, I am certain that I would fight to the last bloody ditch rather than submit to tyranny for myself or my country. But if the choice were "Surrender or have 185,000,000 of your countrymen go up in a mushroom," then I am equally certain that my hands would go up in capitulation. Sacrificing yourself to the defense of your country or an ideal is one thing, but when you want to sacrifice your countrymen in toto, that is another thing entirely.

I note that some character in your letter column is griping about our present economy. I have made something more than a cursory in-

vestigation of different economic systems, and though I'm not an economic expert by any means, I think I have a fairly workable idea of the problem. The idea put forth in the letter column seems to be that we should return to the economic policies of the pre-FDR era.

Our present economic system is something less than completely capitalist and is definitely far from being totally socialist. I prefer the term "regulated capitalism". This regulated capitalism is the only workable economic system which provides for the rights of the people. Of course, feudalism was workable, but it made little pretense of having rights for the serf. In the same manner, laissez faire capitalism (free enterprise with no government controls at all) may have been workable for John D. Rockefeller and others of his ilk, but there was as little practical provision for the worker as there was under feudalism. Sweat shops, child labor, fantastic monopoly practices: all of these were rampant under an economic system with no government regulation.

On the other hand, socialism would not be desirable on a large scale. I agree on this point with Clarence Darrow, who said, "Although I am in sympathy with the aims of the socialists, I cannot be one of them because I have yet to see any proposal which would establish a socialist society and yet provide for the rights of the individual."

As I see it, we now have a fairly good mixture of nine parts capitalism and about one part socialism. And what is important here is that our system both works and makes pretty sure of the individual freedoms of the workers. One without the other will not do. I like this system and I want to generally preserve it. By any decent dictionary definition, this makes me a conservative, but since the Goldwater advent and such things, "conservative" is used pretty much to label the far Right, quasi-Nazi groups. So I usually try to avoid labels on political and economic ideas, since each person has his own definition.

"Inasmuch as all good things are produced by labor, it follows that all such things ought to belong to those whose labor has produced them. But it has happened in all ages of the world that some have labored, and others, without labor, have enjoyed a large proportion of their fruits. This is wrong and should not continue. To secure to each laborer the whole product of his labor as nearly as possible is a worthy object of any good government." --Abraham Lincoln.

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The running fight between Marty Helgesen and the assorted Powers of Darkness has led me to do a bit of thinking on the nature of religion. What vague and indefinite ideas I was beginning to form were clarified by a book I found at the newsstand quite by accident, Wilfred Cantwell Smith's "The Meaning and End of Religion". Smith says, "When one is setting forth one's own faith, one speaks of something deep, personal and transcendently oriented. (...) If one's own 'religion' is attacked, by unbelievers who necessarily conceptualize it schematically, or all religion is, by the indifferent, one tends to leap to the defense of what is attacked, so that presently participants of a faith... are using the term in the same externalist and theoretical sense as their opponents."


It should be fairly evident from Marty Helgesen's arguments, if nothing else, that the existence or non-existence of a deity cannot be proved by means of logic on the basis of the information at hand. It follows that those who believe in a God--not including "Sunday Chris-

CONTINUED AFTER "JOTTINGS"

THE ORDERLY REVOLUTION: He is a prominent and promising political figure who has decided to run for the highest office in the land. The country is immersed in poverty, privation and despair, and he must campaign against both the conservatives who refuse to recognize or admit the necessity for significant change and the extremists who propound an ill-conceived program of revolution and class warfare. The dimensions of his electoral victory surprise the pundits as well as his opponents, and he enters the capital as a conquering hero with a mandate for change, surrounded by a brain trust consisting of university professors, creative artists and economists. In his inaugural address, he asserts the responsibility of government for the welfare of the people and calmly notes that private enterprise alone cannot and will not meet the needs of the nation. Thousands of people in the grip of grinding poverty look to him for deliverance, and he outlines a sweeping program of government action to alleviate the most conspicuous social and economic problems.

Every line of this paragraph could refer to Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932, but actually the hero of this little vignette is Eduardo Frei Montalva, who on September 4, 1964, was elected President of the Republic of Chile. During the next six years, President Frei and his brain trust (alternatively dubbed "the New Frontiersmen" by Americans living in Chile) will endeavor to carry out the far-reaching program of the Christian Democratic Party. Unless unforeseen circumstances should intervene (and the possibility of a coup d'état ousting an elected government can never be entirely dismissed when one is discussing a Latin American nation), there is every likelihood that Chile will experience during the remainder of this decade a fundamental but orderly social revolution. The ultimate goal of President Frei's Grand Design for his country is, according to Raúl Saez, one of his principal advisers, to "turn Chile into a modern, socially progressive state like Denmark or Sweden." But the President and his New Frontiersmen face formidable difficulties in achieving this aim.

The most immediate obstacle in the path of the Christian Democratic program is the strongly conservative Chilean Congress. Congressional elections are to be held in March, and it is hoped that the smashing victory of Frei's ticket in September (he received 56% of the total votes cast, thus becoming the first presidential candidate since 1942 to receive an absolute majority) is an indication of how the electorate will vote in March. But this is by no means a certainty. The Chilean electorate's swing to the Left, which allowed President Frei to amass his impressive majority and the Communist-Socialist candidate, Dr. Salvador Allende, to provide the only significant opposition, is a comparatively recent phenomenon. Frei's predecessor as President, Jorge Alessandri, was a conservative, and the stagnation which characterized his administration was to a great extent responsible for the victory of



the Christian Democrats, but there is no guarantee that the majority of the electorate will not now revert to its previous attitude of conservatism. The problem of a progressive President and a staunchly conservative Congress is one not entirely unfamiliar to us in the United States. In Chile, however, where the franchise is limited to literate citizens and illiterates comprise a substantial segment of the population, the problem is far more acute. The illiterate field workers and peasants, who are most in need of government assistance in every area of their lives, have no representation in Congress; indeed, the latter body is dominated by precisely those elements which profit most from the condition of the ignorant and impoverished peons. Consequently, large portions of the Christian Democratic program of social reform are likely to be torpedoed by the Chilean Congress unless the March elections result in a radical realignment of that assembly.

Ultimately, however, the gravest difficulties confronting the Frei Administration are economic rather than political. The social and economic structure of Chile is depressingly typical of Latin American countries: 80% of the population exists in a state of utter poverty, their condition in many instances little better than slavery, while the remaining 20% of Chile's population consists of a small but growing middle class and a parasitic business and land-owning oligarchy with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. The occasional but nonetheless valiant attempts by the central government to improve the situation have created an additional problem: chronic inflation. Chile is cursed with an unfavorable trade balance, its foreign debts being equal to more than the entire foreign exchange income of four years, and must import \$100 million worth of food annually. And the economy is, of course, insufficiently diversified: 64% of the country's foreign exchange income is produced by the operations of the United States-owned Anaconda and Kennecott copper companies, which also contribute 40% of the nation's total tax income. President Frei acquired a reputation as something of a miracle worker during the period when he built the Chilean Christian Democratic Party into an important force, and during the next six years he ought to have ample opportunity to demonstrate his considerable abilities.

The intellectuals brought into the government by Frei have been organized into twenty specialized task forces, each considering a different aspect of the orderly social and economic revolution projected by the President, and they have begun issuing reports containing specific recommendations. The major features of Frei's "six-year-plan" include a complete program of land reform, which is designed to secure land for 100,000 peasants and to relocate in "economically sound units" (cooperatives) farmers whose plots are too small to be productive, the enfranchisement of illiterates (thus insuring adequate representation to those who most urgently require government assistance), the building of 60,000 housing units per year to alleviate Chile's chronic housing shortage, anti-monopoly legislation intended to destroy the power of the old oligarchy, and the "Chileanization" of the copper industry.

The situation with respect to the copper industry is especially complex and difficult. The new government's attitude toward the foreign-owned copper companies is that they should be utilized in every conceivable manner to contribute to the health and growth of the Chilean economy, if necessary sacrificing short-term profits in order to insure the continued improvement and stability of the economy as a whole. The fundamental assumption on which this policy is founded was outlined in 1961 by Radomiro Tomic, a Frei aid, during a debate in Congress. "Every country," Tomic pointed out, "has the right to live by taking full advantage of its natural resources. This right becomes a duty when the country from which the raw materials are extracted is underdeveloped."

The Frei Administration specifically proposes (1) a massive increase in the production of copper (an increase of 400,000 tons annually, which is 40% of current total production), requiring an investment of over half a billion dollars by Anaconda and Kennecott, (2) maximum refining and fabrication in Chile (much of the copper is currently shipped to the U.S. for refining), thus creating subsidiary industries and more jobs, and (3) the creation of a Copper Sales Corporation, a state monopoly of copper export sales which would purchase the entire output of all the mines at a "weighted average price" and dispose of it on the world market. So long as the copper companies cooperate in these proposals, they will be permitted to continue to function as private industries, but Frei is prepared to nationalize them should that drastic step prove necessary. Integrating copper production into the economy as a whole may well prove to be the most difficult undertaking of Frei's administration. It is difficult to believe that the stockholders of the Anaconda and Kennecott companies would authorize a \$500 million expansion program in a country whose government has announced its willingness to expropriate the holdings of these companies whenever it appears desirable to do so. On the other hand, should the companies prove unresponsive to Frei's suggestions and thus compel him to take the step of nationalizing them, no one would profit. The expansion of production could, I suppose, be financed by the Chilean government, but only at the dreadful expense of diverting \$500-600 million from other areas of the economy. Such a sum represents a lot of houses and classrooms.

But Eduardo Frei Montalva is the sort of person who appears to thrive on difficult problems. He is a passionate admirer of John F. Kennedy and, like his idol, combines a sense of what is required with the practical political skill to achieve it. He may not be capable of solving all the problems of modern-day Chile, but no one who knows him well is betting against him.

THE PACIFICON, the Twenty-Second World Science Fiction Convention, has now passed into history, and, like the massacre of the Huguenots, is not likely to be soon forgotten. The passing of the actual event, however, appears to have deceived careless thinkers into believing that the controversy over the exclusion of Walter Breen from this gathering should no longer occupy a position of prominence in our thoughts. I must confess that the logic of this reasoning escapes me. Those who assert that no purpose can be served by continuing to discuss this most unpleasant incident appear to be accepting the reasoning of the fellow who, after confessing that he had raped his neighbor's wife and set fire to his home, smiled ingenuously at the unfortunate victim of these atrocities and commented, "Since I haven't done anything to you lately, I suggest that we let bygones be bygones." Indeed, the view of those who apparently desire to studiously ignore the actions taken against Walt and Marion Breen is even more inexplicable than this hypothetical situation, for the efforts of the Committee of Public Safety (otherwise known as the Pacificon Committee) continue to exert an influence on the affairs of the fraternity of science fiction devotees: there remains a good chance, if my information is accurate, that Walt will be excluded from the 1966 convention in Cleveland, and at least one of the cities which has expressed interest in the 1967 affair--unfortunately, it is my own beloved Baltimore--has refused to repudiate the concept of arbitrary exclusion. Even if this were not so, it would nevertheless be worthwhile to prolong the discussion of this most regrettable chapter, for so long as even a single individual is convinced that the Committee acted justly and within its powers, the controversy remains very much alive; so long as the actions of the Committee are not condemned by every single observer, the controversy is a festering wound requiring

treatment, not merely an old scar to be ignored.

In the unlikely event that there is anyone reading these words who is not acquainted with the unique and appalling series of events which preceded the unparalleled disaster of the convention itself, perhaps a summary of the outstanding elements of the controversy is in order. By way of partial excuse for the necessarily sketchy nature of such a résumé of bigotry and consummate stupidity, it should be pointed out that this tale is so remarkable and complex that it is extremely difficult to touch upon its highlights in less than five pages. Briefly, it seems that, while living for several years in the San Francisco area and enjoying the charming society of that region's science fiction readers, Walter Breen had acquired a reputation as a homosexual with a special interest in young children. There may or may not be an element of truth in this characterization of Walter, but in any case his own actions and comments appear to have been in some part responsible for this reputation. Such was the admirable liberality and open-mindedness of his associates, however, that this widespread suspicion had no detrimental effect on Walt's social life. But in the summer of 1964, with a world convention being prepared for in San Francisco, several of Walter's former associates, spearheaded by William L. Donaho, suddenly and inexplicably decided that he was a dangerous personality. This self-appointed clique of moral guardians, acting arbitrarily and on their own initiative; revoked Walter Breen's paid membership in the approaching convention, a virtually unprecedented move. Having now tasted blood, the ferocity of the Committee was unbelievable. Working largely through Mr. Donaho, while the three remaining members of the Committee hovered ghoulishly in the background, a concerted campaign of character assassi-

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((○)) "Comrades, I greet you on this, the anniversary of our glorious revolution. Another year has passed, and once again the courage and solidarity of our workers has thwarted attempts by the imperialists to destroy us."

"Take heart, comrades! Every year we grow stronger and the capitalist parasites grow weaker. Before long, the rotten structure of their decadent society will crumble and their oppressed workers will fling off the chains."

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((○)) "Even now, capitalism/imperialism only survives by enslaving the mass of people. Do you know, my brothers, what life is like in the bourgeois States?"

"The workers exist in a state of privation and squalor, enslaved by landlords, exploited by capitalists, oppressed by the State. They are the victims of the most vicious economic system ever conceived."

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((○)) "In ten years, comrades, we hope to catch up to them."

nation was embarked upon. Donaho, the motive force behind this crusade and apparently the participant who most enjoyed the grisly task of verbally crucifying a former friend, baldly announced the intention of the campaign as an effort to completely isolate Walter Breen from all of his former friends and acquaintances. The methods he chose to accomplish this ignoble purpose included broadcasting to every associate of Walter's the "evidence" on which the moral crusade was based--a tissue of fabrications, rumors, distortions and unverifiable assumptions--as well as attempting to convince the local authorities to prosecute Walt under the appropriate California statutes, personally initiating a vile and slanderous rumor aimed at Marion Breen, and prevailing upon a number of weak-willed individuals who would permit themselves to be so used in an effort to blackball Walt from an amateur press group. Fortunately, the most conspicuous aspects of this campaign failed to achieve the desired results (he was admitted to the amateur press group, for instance, in spite of the fuzzy-minded protestations of frightened little old ladies with vermiform minds), but considerable damage was nevertheless done; it is probable that no outsider will ever completely appreciate the emotional pain and anxiety caused to Walt and Marion by this irresponsible and unpardonable effort.

For a number of years, members of the inner circle of science fiction readers have been asserting their intellectual and moral superiority to the majority of the population. This egoistic myth, taken seriously in certain quarters, was utterly and finally discredited by the reaction to the enthusiastic efforts of Donaho's gang of intellectual vandals. Faced with a situation which offered an almost classic opportunity to demonstrate the existence of such virtues as they possessed, the majority of these persons acted in precisely the same manner as any other heterogeneous group of human beings: some of them eagerly formed into a lynch-mob, while many others simply ignored the spectacle unfolding before them on the ground that they were not directly concerned with an attempt to assassinate the character of an acquaintance. I do believe that the former group are more deserving of respect (albeit only slightly), for they at least recognized the obligation to take some sort of action, whereas the second aggregation of individuals, by endeavoring to remain neutral on a moral issue, merely displayed their inability to comprehend that it was a moral issue. To compound their felony, various representatives of this ethically neuter faction developed a seemingly pathological suspicion of those who, unlike themselves, possessed the depth of character to recognize an obligation to protest the actions of the Committee. Those who recognized the injustice of the treatment accorded Walt and Marion were condemned by these self-professed "neutrals" as "notorious liars" and poltroons laboring under the influence of "emotionalism".

The passage of time, whatever its effect upon the righteous indignation of the faint-hearted, may at least have disposed of the irrationality and emotionalism which has permeated this controversy--and which, contrary to the assertion of the very much aligned "neutrals", was confined almost entirely to the camp of the Donaho partisans. It ought now to be possible, for example, to reiterate the principal arguments against the position of the Committee with a reasonable expectation that they will be judged on their own merits rather than on the basis of subconscious fear and guilt regarding homosexuality. There are two fundamental arguments which may be offered in opposition to the actions of Mr. Donaho and his associates: (1) The presumption of innocence should have been sufficient to prohibit action being taken on the basis of the evidence available to the Pacificon Committee; and (2) Even assuming the validity of the evidence, the responsibility of the Committee extended only to safeguarding the membership of the convention and

consequently could justify no action beyond what was required to achieve that goal. Both of these points appear to me entirely reasonable, and the efforts of the Pacificon Committee are condemned by their logic.

Should be argued on every point - lead in garden.

Examine, for example, the evidence upon which the decision of the Committee was professedly based. It is a fundamental principle of the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence that the accused is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt. If this principle is valid in the courtroom, can we afford to accept any less exacting standards in personal intercourse? Are we to suppose that this fundamental rule is not equally worth observing if an associate is accused of being a Communist or an adulterer or a homosexual? Surely before crediting such an accusation we should require some pretty convincing evidence. But what did the Pacificon Committee offer as evidence? Simply this: innuendo, conclusions, second- and third-hand accounts of incidents open to wide interpretation, and witnesses who suddenly became most reticent when the prospect of testifying under oath was raised. This so-called "evidence" is quite sufficiently discredited by the simple fact that, when it was offered to the local authorities, they did not feel it worth the trouble even to indict the accused under the quite stringent California laws dealing with such behavior. Now, the police department and the prosecutor's office of Berkeley, California, cannot be accused of being biased in Walter's favor; clearly, these authorities would be most anxious to bring to trial an individual accused of the heinous crime of child molestation. One thing and one thing only could have influenced their decision to ignore the case--viz., the conspicuous insufficiency of the evidence so helpfully supplied to them by Mr. Donaho. If a vigilant and energetically hostile prosecutor dismisses the charges as so much nonsense, how can friends and acquaintances of the accused presume to judge him guilty?

Suppose, however, for the sake of argument, that the evidence compiled by William L. Donaho and his partners in perfidy was valid. What measures would the Pacificon Committee have been justified in taking if, as their public utterances assured those observers not entirely reconciled to the public destruction of a man's character, their purpose had been merely to protect the members of the convention? Of course, the answer which one offers to this query may depend upon various personal attitudes, but I believe that we can all agree that these measures, to be just, should have satisfied certain minimum requirements. First of all, whatever regulations were formulated in order to deal with the menace of a child-molesting sexual aberrant attending a convention must, to have been valid, apply in a non-discriminatory fashion to every individual who wished to attend. This condition was not fulfilled in the specific case at hand. Whereas Walter Breen was excluded on the basis of accusations, suspicions and assumptions, several individuals who have freely and publicly admitted homosexual tendencies were permitted to attend the affair. It seems difficult to believe that, if the intention of the Committee was actually to protect the membership of the convention, only Walter Breen of the hundreds of potential attendees was considered dangerous enough to exclude. But this remarkable coincidence is clear enough if, as I have contended from the first, the exclusion of Walt Breen was part of a personal vendetta. The Committee denies this, preferring to hide behind their presumed moral obligation to safeguard the virtues, reputations and persons of the membership. Another condition which certainly ought to have been satisfied in order to justify the exclusion was that the measures undertaken by the Committee not go beyond those required to insure that the accused was barred from the convention. It is obvious to all that the actions of Donaho and his followers were intended to accomplish considerably more than this. The actual revoking of Walt's membership could probably have been justi-

fied on the ground that the Committee had an absolute duty to protect the other subscribers, but what of the other measures (which the Committee weakly professes were undertaken unilaterally by Donaho)? Does the publication to the widest possible audience of the accusations and distorted accounts laboriously compiled and edited by Donaho contribute to the safeguarding of the Pacificon membership? Could the success of the convention be enhanced by the obscene and libelous accusation made by Mr. Donaho against Marion Breen? Was the attempted exclusion of Walt from an amateur press association a necessary measure to insure the moral rectitude of the Pacificon? I should think not.

What we are dealing with here is nothing more than the sort of blind bigotry which, in times past, led to the burning of heretics and the oppression of minorities. As in past instances, the brutal self-righteousness of those who presume to elevate themselves to the position of judges of the public good is rendered even more disgusting by the apathy of the many who, by silently acquiescing in the ludicrous proceedings, aid and abet the commission of the crime. In this particular case, it is especially appalling, both as a result of the otherwise likeable nature of the individuals who are permitting themselves to accept such a position and also because the normal justification for such an attitude is here lacking. The Southerner who fails to condemn racial bigotry in spite of his conscience's demand that he speak out can at least plead that to do so would expose him to violent reprisal. This is an understandable if not admirable position. But those who silently condone the treatment accorded Walter Breen even while, I steadfastly hope, realizing in their own hearts that it is unjustified, do so not out of self-preservation but merely because they have not the simple decency to raise their voices. The culprits are a cadre of simple-minded vigilantes who, unlike the Mississippi segregationists, do not command any power of law, force or boycott; their power consists solely in the unwillingness of the majority to defy them. I have no illusions that this essay will inspire any significant improvement in the situation, but I do know that the very worst thing that could happen would be for this controversy to die while its issues remain unresolved and thus release the hesitant from the eventual necessity of stating a definite position.

THE VIETNAM SITUATION: The complexities of the political and military situation in Southeast Asia are such that only trained specialists can hope to entirely comprehend all of the diverse and subtle aspects of policy and counter-policy concerning that region. One consequence of this is a widening gulf of ignorance separating the tiny minority of supposed "experts" from the vast majority of the citizenry, which is a particularly dangerous development in a free society, where the public is presumed to possess an understanding (however imperfect and limited) of basic policy issues. A secondary consequence, more irritating if ultimately less important, is the tendency of the specialists to develop an insular attitude (a condition especially noticeable today among, for example, physicians, who appear to resent a patient who understands medical terminology and is capable of reading the scribbles on a prescription slip). The trouble is that there is actually no such thing as an "expert" in a field which deals with the inter-relationship of the rapidly evolving policies of dozens of constantly changing nations dominated by humanely unpredictable leaders. The specialist on one or another aspect of foreign policy is merely an individual who, like the meteorologist, has managed to absorb sufficient background information to enable him to offer predictions, but without any assurance that the predictions will prove accurate. The fallibility of the weatherman is constantly acknowledged as a running joke in near-

ly every civilized community, of course; but the foreign affairs specialist, whose predictions are usually considerably less accurate (because the information on which they are based contains far more variables and the field in which he operates is not governed by fundamental laws such as those of physics), is not likewise read with a grain of salt by the average citizen, because his errors are neither so obvious nor so immediately perceptible. Consequently, there is a tendency to accept the conclusions of "experts" in the affairs of, say, Indo-China, even when our reason strongly indicates that they are untenable.

The Administration experts contend that the American and South Vietnamese air attacks against military targets in North Vietnam which occurred on February 7th and 8th were a legitimate and appropriate response to Viet Cong assaults against United States military compounds at Pleiku and Tuy Hoa on February 6th. Can a minor thinker such as your obedient servant, whose entire stock of knowledge on this region and its politics derives merely from voracious reading, presume to dispute the judgment of these eminent authorities? After all, it is certainly true that the simultaneous assaults on Pleiku and Tuy Hoa constituted the most damaging direct attacks on United States installations and personnel since we became involved in the guerilla war, and it is difficult to believe that the occurrence of these attacks at the precise time that Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin was visiting Hanoi was a coincidence (though the delayed reaction in the Soviet press appears to indicate that Kosygin and the other Soviet leaders were taken by surprise by the Viet Cong move and the subsequent retaliation). Nevertheless, it is necessary to remember that the National Liberation Front, no matter how much assistance it has requested and received from Hanoi, remains a South Vietnamese organization, and the government of North Vietnam has only limited control over (and hence limited responsibility for) its actions. This situation is not at all comparable to the Tonkin Gulf incidents of August, 1964, where vessels of the North Vietnamese Navy attacked the United States destroyers Maddox and C. Turner Joy.

Whether or not Washington's response was "appropriate" is, of course, essentially an academic consideration. Confrontations in this era of Cold War do not customarily obey a rigidly defined set of rules, and the participants can hardly be reproached for "inappropriate" responses in the manner that high school debators are criticized for unduly insulting their opponents. Air strikes against unfriendly military bases fall well within the frame of reference for Cold War actions accepted by all of the participating governments. Nor is any purpose to be served by concentrating on the question of morality--not because there may not be valid moral objections to such military reprisals, but simply because such abstract concepts are of little concern to governments formulating policy. The United States air strikes against "staging areas" (barracks and other military installations) within the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam must be examined not in the context of the (dubiously defined) "legitimacy" of such reprisals, but rather in the context of the probable results of this action. Are there, from the viewpoint of American interests in Southeast Asia and elsewhere (and with the stipulation that continued avoidance of thermonuclear war is the paramount American interest), positive effects to be expected as a result of this military action against the Hanoi regime; and, if so, are they outweighed by negative effects? This is the question which this article proposes to examine.

It should be understood at the outset that this current series of air actions against North Vietnam and any similar actions in the future cannot appreciably improve the internal situation in South Vietnam. The position of the United States and the loyalist Vietnamese is likely to continue to deteriorate at approximately the present rate re-

gardless of military measures which may be initiated outside the territory of that chaotic country. Even in the unlikely event that all forms of intervention by the North Vietnamese could be halted, the war in South Vietnam could not be successfully concluded by a government which does not possess the allegiance of the majority of its people. The results of air strikes against North Vietnam, therefore, are almost entirely confined to the much broader areas of relations between the United States and the various Communist nations, relations among the Communist countries, and the balance of power in Asia.

The prevailing opinion in Washington on February 7th was that the large-scale Viet Cong attacks of the previous day against United States compounds were directed from Hanoi and intended as a challenge to this country--a test, as it were, of our determination to remain in Southeast Asia. It is worthwhile to note that our willingness to attach this interpretation to the incident and the presence of three aircraft carriers in an area of the South China Sea usually patrolled by only one may indicate that President Johnson was anticipating some sort of increase in Communist activity in the region. (A more cynical interpretation is that he was awaiting just such a pretext in order to justify a gambit like the Dong Hoi raids.) Whatever its intention, however, it is understandable that the Pleiku assault was viewed as a slap in the face, with implications of a "dare". You may recall that the same view was advanced last August with respect to the otherwise inexplicable Tonkin Gulf incidents. This is a favorite tactic of the Communists. "Stick out a bayonet," Lenin advised. "If it encounters soft flesh, stick it out further; if it encounters steel, pull it back." Pursuing such a policy requires periodic efforts to measure the determination of opponents to respond forcefully.

But the subtleties of the Sino-Soviet dispute introduce new and complex dimensions into this little game. One of the reasons for Soviet Premier Kosygin's official trip to Hanoi was to discuss the possibility of increased Russian military assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. North Vietnam is not entirely committed to supporting China as the outstanding exponent of Marxism, although the demands of geography require general acceptance of Peking's position, and the Soviet Union no doubt desires to decrease as much as possible Ho Chi Minh's dependence on Communist China. If the Pleiku and Tuy Hoa raids were indeed ordered by Hanoi, as the United States charges, then it is possible that they were intended to provoke United States military action against the territory of North Vietnam. From the viewpoint of the North Vietnamese leaders (who have reasons of their own for desiring to keep their "big brother", the People's Republic of China, at arm's length), this may have seemed an excellent method of insuring maximum military assistance from the Soviet Union. One can imagine Mr. Kosygin's embarrassment at being confronted simultaneously with a United States attack on the territory of his hosts and copies of the Soviet Union's repeated pledges to protect North Vietnam from aggression. (This is not the only possible motive for the timing of the Pleiku assault, of course. Walter Lippmann suggests an alternative, viz., that the Chinese initiated this series of events in order to embarrass Kosygin and demonstrate that the Russians were neither willing nor able to defend North Vietnam against the United States.)

If the issuance of this "challenge" to the United States was deliberately planned by Hanoi in order to impress the Soviet Premier with the necessity for offering a comprehensive defense commitment to North Vietnam, then it must be noted that the effort does not appear to have been an outstanding success. It is true that the Soviet Union announced that "recent incidents" had compelled it to offer unspecified military assistance to the Hanoi regime, but there is little doubt that this was

simply a convenient justification for a decision which had already been taken. It is significant to note that Pham Van Dong, Premier of North Vietnam, described the talks with the Soviet delegation as "friendly and frank". "Frank" is a word possessing peculiar connotations when used by the Communists to refer to negotiations; it generally indicates that there has been disagreement. In this context, it probably means that North Vietnam requested more than the Soviet Union was prepared to deliver in the way of military assistance and defense commitments.

The destruction of a United States military billet at Qui Nhon on February 10th deepened the crisis, but it is not certain exactly how this incident is related to the previous series of events. It is known that there was a general upsurge of guerilla activities following the air strikes across the 17th Parallel, unquestionably instigated by the North Vietnamese in retaliation for the bombings, but the murderous dynamiting of the Qui Nhon billet was not necessarily specifically ordered by Hanoi. The character of this particular assault is different than that of the Pleiku or Tuy Hoa attacks, because it required neither large numbers of guerillas nor heavy weapons. Two Vietnamese carrying demolition equipment were found dead in the wreckage of the building, and it is quite possible that no additional personnel were involved. There is no proof that these men were acting on orders from North Vietnam, nor, for that matter, is there direct evidence that they were Viet Cong (they could have been, e.g., Buddhist fanatics convinced that the problems of their nation could only be solved by United States withdrawal). It seems rather unlikely that Hanoi would wish to directly antagonize the United States in this manner so soon after viewing a convincing demonstration of the vulnerability of their facilities to air attack.

Whatever the purpose of the Qui Nhon slaughter, Washington had no alternative but to view it as counter-retaliation for Dong Hoi and once again order air strikes against the North. This illustrates one of the dangers of "escalation": after a certain point, the participants suddenly discover that they no longer have an option as to whether to pursue the conflict or withdraw. The United States could not fail to respond to the Qui Nhon outrage so soon after establishing the precedent of retaliatory strikes against North Vietnam whenever the Viet Cong direct a large-scale attack against United States facilities or personnel. The situation is analogous to a game of stud poker, where the players bet heavily on the early cards, then discover that they cannot afford to fold but must continue the game to the bitter end, even when they realize they hold a losing hand.

If the Tonkin Gulf affair was a "tit-for-tat" situation, then the current crisis must be described as a "tit-for-tat-for-tit-for-tat" confrontation. Hopefully, the United States air strikes against Chan Hoa and Chap Le on the afternoon of February 11th completes the current series of moves in this appalling chess game. At this writing (February 15th), neither the North Vietnamese nor the Viet Cong have taken any extraordinary action, and it appears that the situation is settling down to what approaches normalcy in Indo-China.

In general, the United States appears to have gained more during the five crucial days of confrontation than it lost. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam has been forcefully reminded once again that the United States is capable of destroying Hanoi's industrial capability, created during ten years of painful effort, and Ho Chi Minh is likely to think very carefully before encouraging the Southern rebels to make any further massive attacks against American installations. The Communist Chinese assertion that the United States is a "paper tiger" has been further discredited by this series of incidents, which, apart from being beneficial to our interests, cannot entirely displease the Soviet

Union. On the other hand, relations between the United States and Russia appear to have suffered remarkably little: protests in the Soviet press have been reasonably cautious, promises of aid to North Vietnam against any further aggression have been unspecific, and the only direct action undertaken by the Kremlin was the initiation of "massive retaliation" against the windows of the American embassy in Moscow.

It might also be interesting to consider the effects of the joint American-South Vietnamese air strikes on the Sino-Soviet conflict. Coming at a time when the Russians are attempting to regain influence in Southeast Asia and particularly in Hanoi, these air attacks probably confronted the Soviet Union with an unappetizing choice between fully supporting the "revolutionary struggle of the peoples" in Vietnam and continuing to improve relations with the West in general and the United States in particular. These alternatives are, for all practical purposes, mutually exclusive, and I have no doubt that the Soviets would have preferred postponing such a decision or avoiding it altogether. The caution with which they have reacted to this latest crisis indicates that the Kremlin is not willing to sacrifice détente with the United States for the dubious advantage of being nominated as the principal protector of North Vietnam. But such a decision can only force the Hanoi regime into a closer association with Communist China, which, having nothing whatever to lose in terms of American good-will, responded in a typically bellicose fashion. Both the Soviet Union and China have also utilized the crisis as an occasion for stressing the necessity for solidarity within the Communist camp, with the result that relations between the feuding giants are more courteous than they have been for some time. What has occurred here is not, I think, any fundamental reconciliation, but rather a mutual agreement to ignore doctrinal disputes in order to present a united front to the "capitalist aggressors". This is rather like a Protestant and a Catholic agreeing to stop arguing long enough to rebut the criticism of an atheist: the divergent interests and views will reassert themselves as soon as the immediate crisis passes.

It appears reasonable to conclude that, with a minimum of actual risk, something was gained (psychologically and politically, not militarily) by the air strikes against North Vietnamese targets. At the very least Hanoi may suggest to the comrades in the South that it is not useful to stage further large-scale attacks against United States compounds. But there is a grave danger in even this minor victory, viz., the danger of assuming that because something was gained by this series of thrusts across the border, it therefore follows that something more is to be

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"You know, when the President was in Bethesda Naval Hospital, it took the hospital staff and his personal physician four days to cure his cold."

"It seems to me that, with all of these marvelous advances in medical technology, it ought to be possible to cure a cold in less time than that."

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"Of course, I don't suppose you can expect a helluva lot for \$1.25 per day..."

gained by conducting similar raids in the future. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have for some time been urging President Johnson to authorize large-scale air strikes against targets in the North, including not only military camps but also strategic targets such as the hydroelectric plant which supplies power for the capital city of Hanoi. To act on these suggestions would virtually insure a disastrous Korea-type war in Indo-China, a war in which nothing could be gained and which, even if it were prevented from escalating into a thermonuclear holocaust, would entail the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of American troops. Significantly, the Army, which would bear the principal burden of fighting such a war, has consistently warned against such a course of action; but the Navy and the Air Force, imbued with a sense of American omnipotence and in a position to ignore the grim possibilities of an Asian land-war, have encouraged expanding the conflict.

To retreat from a confrontation instigated by the other side is generally unwise, but to pursue a policy of deliberately provoking such confrontations would be a grievous error. The North Vietnamese and the Communist Chinese cannot permit the continuance of such raids without desperately losing face; and when dealing with basically irresponsible opponents such as the Peking leaders, it is not wise to assume that because we got away with a precipitous gambit twice we could necessarily do so three, four or eight times.

--Ted Pauls

—DISSENTING OPINIONS—

CONTINUED

tians" and the like--must base their belief on something other than logic; the only ones who are convinced by logical proofs of God, I would guess, are those who already believe in Him. This admits of two possibilities: first, that they are operating on the same information as we heathen, in which case we might feel justified in considering them to be fools; second, that they are in possession of some evidence not at the disposal of the unbeliever. I'm inclined to support the latter theory, foolish as people in general sometimes seem. This evidence, of course, is the "something deep, personal and transcendently oriented" to which Smith refers. A religious person has this conviction, in that the presence of God is an integral part of his being. An attempt to communicate this feeling to a non-religious person would be like describing the color red to a blind man. All this, however, has no bearing whatsoever on the validity or lack of it of this evidence. To a drunkard, his pink elephants or whatever are every bit as real as God is to Marty Helgesen. (Your analogy of describing a color to a blind man is unfortunate, in that it implies that we heathen are defective because we are unable to perceive God.)

In attempting to defend his religious convictions, one cannot communicate the essence of his belief, his personal conviction of God's existence. He can only defend the outward attributes of his beliefs, which will in all probability seem rather silly to one who does not share the belief. For example, to a non-Christian the ritual of baptism --and the whole dunking-versus-sprinkling controversy--might seem trivial; not so to a Christian, to whom baptism is one of the most meaningful moments of his life.

The only trouble with George Price's statement that "The foundation of constitutional government and the rule of law is that laws mean exactly what their authors intended, and may be changed only by formal amendment, not by interpretation" is that sometimes it's a bit difficult

to ascertain the intentions of the authors, lacking as we do a system of retroactive telepathy. For another thing, "the authors" were not always of a single mind on a given subject. For example, take the First Amendment and the Supreme Court's school prayer decision. A typical argument against the Court's ruling is that "The Founding Fathers were Christians and never meant..." etc. At this late date, what the Founding Fathers meant is rather difficult to discover except by consulting their written works. Some of the pious among us might be rather surprised if they read such things as James Madison's "A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments" or Thomas Jefferson's Statute of Religious Freedom. Then, on the other hand, there was Patrick Henry, who proposed a bill to make all citizens of Virginia pay "a moderate tax or contribution" for the support of the Christian religion or some form of Christian worship. Now, what did the Founding Fathers contend? (Since, as you say, it is often impossible to determine precisely what the authors of the Constitution intended a provision to encompass, what the conservative really means when he advocates preserving the original meaning of laws is that the first interpretation of a constitutional provision is necessarily superior to any later, contrary interpretations. There seems to me no reasonable basis on which to assume that this is in fact the case. This situation reveals a fundamental weakness of conservatism. Most so-called "conservatives" object to the Gideon decision because it is a radical innovation; presumably, if it had been the practice throughout the country to provide lawyers to defendants and the Supreme Court had ruled that this was unnecessary, conservatives would also have objected to that. This can, under certain circumstances, be a valid position, but by rendering irrelevant in a consideration of its value the merits of a particular decision, it transforms the basis for determining the value of a decision into a mere matter of precedent.)

"The Chaplain's Bombshell" is yet another item that brings to mind the many similarities of the upheavals going on throughout Christianity--most notably, of course, in Catholicism--to the Protestant Reformation of the 1500's and later. No one has been burned yet, of course, but the general trend is the same. Perhaps the major difference is that the current reformation is taking place within the institutional structures of established religious bodies rather than breaking away from the parent bodies.

The censorship of "pornography" resembles as much as anything else sympathetic magic. The conservatives--or rather, the censors, since not all conservatives support censorship by any means--seem to feel that they can apply the law of homeopathy to sex, and eliminate sexual misbehavior by eliminating descriptions of it. It would be very interesting, if the trend continues, to see photographs of Robert Welch sticking pins in wax dolls of President Johnson, Stuart Chase, or whoever is his current subversive whipping boy.

A postscript to my remarks on education in #74 might be in order. During the past week my English class has been studying the work of Ralph Waldo Emerson. Ostensibly the students were to discuss the material in class and then be prepared to evaluate and interpret portions of it when they were tested. What actually happened was that about half a dozen students out of 35 discussed the material, the teacher discussed the discussion, and the other students memorized her interpretation. What's that about the "benefits of having the group work together as a whole"?

Perhaps the "younger and more virile America" cited by Eric Blake was less concerned about world public opinion because at the time "world public opinion" amounted to much less than it does now. The difference is about of the order of that between a mouse and an alligator. Just af-

ter the Spanish-American War there was no clever, unscrupulous and powerful enemy (not to mention sincere, well-meaning noncombatants) to raise the roof about "Western imperialism" and the like. At that time, we could function as a nation fairly well with no friends, but not now.

The controversy over "liberalism" and "conservatism" smacks suspiciously of semantics. To you, Ted, "liberalism" means "belief in progress and reforms" and the like, which probably by no coincidence at all resembles the dictionary definition rather closely. To a distressingly large number of others, "liberalism" is identified only with what is liberalism in the context of 20th Century American politics, economics, and so forth. That's how conservatives manage to claim Jefferson as a teammate. His views coincide with many of the views espoused by 20th Century American Conservatives, although at the time he was in office and formulating those views, he was considered a part of the liberal wing, as opposed to the conservatives who wished to set up a state reminiscent of that we had just finished rebelling against.

"A free election which the communists win is a contradiction in terms." How convenient a piece of double-talk that is! The only factual basis for the statement is that the communists have not yet won a free election, of course. In the future, if by chance a free election somewhere is won by communists, we may comfort ourselves with the thought that, after all, it probably wasn't a free election anyway--or perhaps they weren't really communists. (Communists came to power in a free election in the Republic of San Marino, I believe, and were thrown out again when it was discovered that they were incompetent to manage the affairs of that microscopic country. And communists quite regularly win municipal elections in Northern Italy and elsewhere, as well as parliamentary seats in Italy, France, India, etc.)

Perhaps some of the readers of Kipple would like to try a small demonstration of political balance. Anyone who does should go to the nearest public library and lean two volumes of the Encyclopedia Britannica together, then pound on the table. If the experiment is not interrupted by scandalized librarians, the observer will probably find that before long both volumes will fall over.

This is the basic assumption behind the recognition of Red China, economic and cultural intercourse with Soviet Russia, and the like. The Cold War is an inherently unstable set of circumstances, as should be obvious. Is it not better to have those two countries as friends--or at least as slightly less belligerent and hostile acquaintances--than to fight a war with either or both, a war which would almost certainly be disastrous for all concerned and many of those not concerned?

"Government is a northeast wind that blows property into a few aristocratic accumulations and leaves a great deal of democratic bare ground in between." --Ezra Heywood.

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A congressman's first loyalty had better be to his constituents if he expects to be around long enough to accomplish anything. This loyalty can be, should be, and occasionally is modified by loyalties to his party, nation, personal convictions, or even humanity as a whole. But under any democratic system, an official's first duty is to get in, and stay in, office. If he fails in that, he can have all the humanity you want and it won't do anyone much good. (Lyndon Johnson, whose liberalism has increased as his dependence on conservative Texas voters has decreased, is a good example.)

I doubt that selling the Post Office would do much good to any-

one, since, as Borsella points out, it would have to be a regulated monopoly rather than free competition in order to function effectively. At present, our telephone service is both more expensive and less efficient than postal service. On the other hand, how about simply killing the law that forbids private agencies to carry first-class mail? United Parcel Service does a pretty good job of competing with government parcel post; their rates are, on the whole, lower than parcel post rates, despite taxes. A private letter-carrier might be able to do just as well, and might provide a little competition. (However, any such service would be--at least at the start--relatively inconvenient for many people, so we keep the Post Office operating while the private organization gradually takes over the burden of the load, and we obtain the right of choice as a bonus.)

Inform Eisenstein that any ship has two bows--starboard and port. References to the "bows"--plural--of a ship are easily found in any literature pertaining to the sea. "She was divin' bows under with 'er main skys'l set" (traditional chantey); "On either side of the bows of the ship, some two or three feet above the water line, a narrow strip had been cut away" (from a report on the Mary Celeste).

"Population control means birth control. Why the idea of the practice should arouse such emotional opposition I find difficult to understand. It is as though nothing must be done to interfere with the course of nature, no matter where the course of nature leads, and as though we have been interfering with nature in no other way. No technique of control is at present entirely satisfactory but I have little doubt that one that is will be discovered before very long. And in so far as it becomes generally available I have no doubt at all that woman-kind will adopt it. In overcrowded Japan and in swarming India where the crisis is already acute, with worse to come, the need for sensible adjustment of people to resources is so great that controls are already officially encouraged; while even in Mexico, in spite of church edicts to the contrary, a movement spreads to keep human beings in balance with the land. Given the freedom to choose, and the means, human beings everywhere and particularly the women who bear the brunt of child bearing and rearing are anxious to raise children with a chance for health and happiness--no one cares to see the majority of infants die of disease or chronic starvation, which is the state of affairs prevailing throughout the orient, and neither does the human species have any need of this particular form of natural selection, which is not the selection of any worthwhile human traits." --N. J. Berrill, in "Man's Emerging Mind".

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I noted only one slight discordant note in your catalogue of preferences, and that concerned your taste in women. I remember somewhere long ago your assertion that the women who most appealed to you were the most exotic, while the only ones among those you've listed as personally appealing that might fit this term would be Diahann Carroll and Barbara McNair. No Orientals? Jews? Sultry Mediterraneans? This, naturally enough, does not preclude the possibility that there's an Armenian girl down the street who turns you on, but whose name would be of little interest to your readers. (Well, I suppose I should have mentioned the Polynesian girl who appears on the television commercial for Duncan Hines' Pineapple Supreme cake, whose name I do not happen to know.)

Aside from the fact that only Skinner consistently finds teaching machines to be of value equal to standard instruction, there are

other difficulties involved. For one, a standard theoretical question, completely removed from all questions of motivation and boredom and the sorts of things that your readers have concerned themselves with. (This is the value of commenting on an issue which is as old as the hills.) Standard teaching machines are programmed with small steps, so that the student will make as few mistakes--preferably none--as possible; each step follows so slowly and logically from the last that errors are minimized. This is one way to approach the problem, but it's not at all clear that this is preferable to allowing the pupil to err, simply because there may be value in making mistakes and discovering them.

As long as you seem interested in bits and tidbits concerning LSD, without any sort of framework to connect them, I suppose I could throw out a few of my own. Were you aware, for example, that spiders given LSD construct very regular webs, while those given mescaline roam all over the place and in general behave bizarrely? That the word "berserk" comes from "Berserkers", a group of early Norse pirates who cajoled under the influence of hallucinogenic mushrooms? That a substance known as Brom-LSD can prevent psychotomimetic behavior in subjects given LSD, and that nicotinic acid can curb the aberrant behavior once it has begun? That Havelock Ellis, listening to music he had never heard before, while under the influence of mescaline, could conjure up images which later proved to fit the titles of the compositions? That certain Amazon tribes involve all their members in hallucinations by having a few tribesmen eat a sacred vine, then urinate and allow the others to drink the urine? That Cary Grant, after LSD therapy, decided that for the first time he could really love a woman? That yohimbine, a noted aphrodisiac, is also a hallucinogenic? That the psychotomimetics have been termed such fascinating things as "Nirvana for the millions" and "instant zen" while their users have been dubbed (by the SEP, appropriately enough) "misplaced lotus-eaters".

Ain't you fascinated?

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